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RELIGIOUS LANDMARK PRESERVATION
UNDER THE FIRST AND FIFTH
AMENDMENTS: ST. BARTHOLOMEW'S
CHURCH v. CITY OF NEW YORK
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the practice of landmarking religious institutions has come under careful scrutiny due to concerns1 that
landmark statutes2 may infringe upon two important constitutional rights: the right to the free exercise of religion 3 and the right
to be compensated for government takings.4 Nonetheless, while the
constitutional ramifications of such statutes have been the subject
of much commentary,5 the United States Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed the constitutionality of landmarking of religious structures. The Court has, however, provided some insight
in this area through its analysis of disputes concerning the free exercise clause 7 and of claims arising under the takings clause stem' See Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1562, 1562-63 (1984). State courts have been unable to agree on the effect that the free
exercise clause has on state regulation of land use. See id. at 1562. In New York, an "interdenominational group of churches" has challenged New York City's landmark preservation
statute as "a violation of the burden on free exercise clause." Id. at 1563.
2 See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, §§ 25-305 to 25-321 (1986) (New York
Landmarks Preservation and Historic Districts Law).
'See U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment states, in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." Id.
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. V. "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use without
just compensation." Id.
See Crewdson, Ministry and Mortar: Historic Preservation and the First Amendment After Barwick, 33 WASH. U.J. URB.& CONTEMP. L. 137, 139-45 (1988). While several
states have established rules of preference for churches in land use cases, generally state and
federal courts do not afford any special status solely on the basis of religious affiliation. Id.;
see Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
1301, 1304 (1989).
8 See infra notes 49 & 72-73 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1600 (1990) (free exercise clause
does not prohibit application of Oregon drug law to Native Americans concerning religious
ceremonial ingestion of peyote); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 695-96 (1989)
(Internal Revenue Code governing charitable deductions does not violate of free exercise
clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits to
Seventh-Day Adventist whose religion precluded working on Saturday violates free exercise
clause).
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ming from land use regulation.8

Recently, in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York,"
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of landmark statutes with respect to religious
organizations by finding the New York Landmark Preservation
statute 10 to be constitutional as applied to St. Bartholomew's
Church on both first and fifth amendment grounds."' In St. Bartholomew's, a controversy arose following the New York Landmark
Preservation Commission's 12 1967 landmarking of the St. Bartholo-

mew Protestant Episcopal Church and its adjacent Community
House.'" Under the New York statute, such a designation is significant because it requires continual maintenance of any designated
15
structure 4 and prohibits alteration of the structure's exterior
1 See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (takings
clause violated where state conditioned granting of building permit on private owner granting public easement); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481
(1987) (Court rejected takings challenge directed at state law prohibiting mining that causes
substantial damage to buildings); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980) (city
zoning ordinance governing land use not facially unconstitutional).
9 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3433 (March 4, 1991).
19 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, §§ 25-301 to 25-321 (1986). The public policy
underlying New York's Landmark Preservation statute is to promote the "protection, enhancement, perpetuation and use of improvements of landscape features of special character
or special historical or aesthetic interest or value." Id. § 25-301(b). Such protections were
declared by the legislature to be a "public necessity and ... required in the interest of...
the health, prosperity, safety and welfare of the people." Id.
" See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 350.
1" Id. at 351. The Commission is required by law to be made up of at least three architects, one historian, one city planner or landscape architect, and at least one resident from
all five New York City boroughs. See Penn Central Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
110 n.8 (1978).
" See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 351. The Church building is located on the east
side of Park Avenue between 50th and 51st Streets in Manhattan. Id. Adjacent to the
Church building, at the northeast corner of Park Avenue and 50th Street, is the Community
House. Id. The Community House is a terraced, seven-story building used by the Church to
hold a variety of social and religious activities. Id. The building contains a sixty-student
preschool, a large theater, athletic facilities, meeting rooms and offices. Id. Additionally,
meals are prepared in the Community House for the homeless pursuant to a community
ministry program operated by the Church. Id.
In designating the Church and Community House as landmarks, the Commission described them as possessing a "special historical and aesthetic interest and value as part of
the development, heritage and cultural aspects of New York City." Id.
1" See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-305 (1986). All persons in charge of a
designated landmark site must keep in good repair all exterior portions as well as any interior portions which, if not maintained will effect the exterior portions. Id. § 25-311(a).
n See id. § 25-305. Section 25-305(a)(1) provides: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person
in charge of a landmark site ... to alter, reconstruct or demolish... a part of such site ...
or to construct any improvement upon land embraced within such site." Id.
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without the consent of the Landmark Commission. 6 Although St.
Bartholomew's Church was in full compliance with the statute's
maintenance requirements, the Commission denied the Church
permission to demolish its Community House and to erect a fortyseven story office tower in its place.17 Citing a need to construct
the tower for the purpose of increasing revenue for necessary
church activities,1 8 St. Bartholomew's Church challenged this denial on the grounds of free exercise and government taking. 9
This Note will examine the Second Circuit's decision in St.
Bartholomew's and assert that the court was correct in holding
that the landmark statute was constitutional on both first and fifth
amendment grounds. Part One will discuss the various analyses applied by the Supreme Court in resolving free exercise challenges.
Part Two will outline the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
fifth amendment takings clause in the area of land use regulation.
Finally, Part Three will examine the Second Circuit's analysis in
St. Bartholomew's and suggest that based on Supreme Court precedent, the St. Bartholomew's court was correct in upholding the
validity of the New York Landmark Preservation statute as applied to St. Bartholomew's Church.
I.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In construing the free exercise clause of the first amendment, 0
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the free'21
dom to act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute.
16

See id. § 25-306. An owner desiring to construct, reconstruct, alter or demolish any

part of a landmarked building must first request permission from the Commission by filing
an application together with a request for a "certificate of no effect on protected architectural features." Id. § 25-306(a)(1). The Commission must then issue its decision within
thirty days. Id. § 25-306(a)(2). The Commission has wide discretion in the exercise of its
powers. Id. § 25-304.
17 See St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 961 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
18 See Brief for Appellant at 2-3, St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914
F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-7751, 90-7101) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. St. Bartholomew's contended that "the new building would provide space for various church activities" and "generate income ... essential to support [the Church's] mission to repair and
rehabilitate the church building and ... assure the survival of the Church." Id.
19 See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 350.
2'The free exercise clause of the first amendment applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). In Cantwell,
the Court held that the "fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth]

Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id.
21 Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1608 (1990). The Smith Court cited
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However, the Court has noted that this right, though not absolute,22 is given a "preferred position. 23 Recent Supreme Court decisions provide an analytical framework for establishing the scope
of the rights protected by this "preferred position.

Brown,2 5 while

' 24

In Braunfeld

v.
examining a free exercise challenge of a Pennsylvania statute which proscribed the Sunday retail sale of certain
enumerated commodities
brought by Orthodox Jewish
merchants,26 the Court adopted a balancing test that weighed the
government's secular goal in regulating religious conduct against
the indirect burden such regulation placed upon the free exercise
of religion. In addition, this test considered whether the government could accomplish its purpose by less burdensome means. In
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878), where the Court, in upholding a
conviction for polygamy, stated: "laws are made for the government of actions and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Id.
at 166.
22 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303. In Cantwell, the Court described the exercise of religion as consisting of both the freedom to believe and the freedom to act and stated that
"[tihe first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to the regulation for the protection of society." Id at 303-04.
2 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). In Murdock, the Court determined that a municipal ordinance that required Jehovah Witnesses to pay a tax to distribute literature and solicit donations for books and pamphlets was unconstitutional as
applied. Id. at 106-07. The Court reached this conclusion by finding that the ordinance
violated three first amendment freedoms: speech, press, and religion. Id. at 113-15. In addressing the contention that the statute treated all who came within its measure equally, the
Court observed that "[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a
preferred position." Id. at 115.
2' See infra notes 25-69 and accompanying text.
366 U.S. 599 (1961).
2 Id. at 601. In Braunfeld, Orthodox Jewish merchants challenged a Pennsylvania
"Sunday closing" law on the ground that their religion required them to close their businesses on Saturdays, and that a mandatory Sunday closing requirement would seriously impair their ability to earn a living. Id. They contended that the burden placed on them by
this law violated their religious free exercise right. Id. at 602. The Court, however, upheld
the constitutionality of the law, reasoning that Pennsylvania had a legitimate state interest
in requiring a general day of rest. Id. at 608. The Court further determined that permitting
the plaintiffs to remain open on Sunday would enable them to gain an economic advantage
over their competition. Id. at 608-09. Thus, the Court reasoned that a ruling in favor of the
merchants could result in persons asserting their religious convictions merely to keep their
businesses open on Sunday and close them on what had previously been their least profitable day. Id. at 609. Such a result, the Court noted, "might make necessary a state-conducted
inquiry into the sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs, a practice which a State might
believe would itself run afoul of the spirit of constitutionally protected religious guarantees." Id.
" See id. at 607. The Braunfeld Court stated:
[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the
purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is
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a later case, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 28
the Court honed its free exercise analysis by requiring that the
contending party prove "the coercive effect of the enactment as it
operates against him in the practice of his religion. 2 9 The Court
further refined its free exercise analysis in Sherbert v. Verner,3 0
when it addressed an issue concerning the refusal of South Carolina's Employment Security Commission to award unemployment
benefits to the plaintiff based on her refusal to work on Saturdays."' The plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist

Church, was prohibited from working on Saturday pursuant to her

religious beliefs.3 2 In challenging the Commission's position, the
plaintiff contended that she was being deprived of her right to free
exercise of her religion.3 3 Upon examination of her claim, the Court
concluded that the Commission's ruling was unconstitutional on
free exercise grounds, 4 reasoning that government action found to
substantially infringe upon the free exercise of religion 3 5 must be
valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.
Id.
The Court also noted that if the purpose or effect of the law is to discriminate between
religions or impede the observance of religious beliefs, then even an indirect burden would
render the law unconstitutional. Id.
28 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963). In Schempp, the Court struck down a Pennslyvania
statute requiring Bible reading in public schools, reasoning that the government must remain neutral with respect to religious beliefs and exercises, and that "[iun the relationship
between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality." Id. at
226.
29 Id. at 223. The Schempp Court noted that the purpose of the free exercise clause is
to "secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil
authority." Id. Therefore, for a constitutional violation to exist, it is necessary to show that
the coercive effect of the regulation hinders the practice of the individual religion in question. Id.
20 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
21 Id. at 401. In Sherbert, the Commission found that the claimant's refusal to work on
Saturday disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits because she had failed,
without good cause, to accept "suitable work when offered." Id.
2 Id. at 399 n.1. There was no dispute that the basic tenet of Seventh-Day Adventists
is prohibition of work on Saturdays. Id.
23 Id. at 400.
24 Id. at 409-10.
2 See id. at 403-04. The Court commenced its analysis by examining whether the statute at issue imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiff's right to exercise her religion
freely. Id. at 403. The Court concluded that there was an unconstitutional burden imposed
on the plaintiff since the Commission's ruling forced her to "choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand." Id. at 404.
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supported by a compelling governmental interest.36 Furthermore,
the Court noted that the regulation must constitute the least restrictive means of achieving the proposed governmental objective. 7
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,38 the Court was presented with the opportunity to apply its recently developed free exercise balancing
test."9 In Yoder, the Court determined that Wisconsin's refusal to
exempt fourteen and fifteen-year-old Amish students from a statewide compulsory school attendance law, which required attendance
until the age of sixteen, was invalid on free exercise grounds.40 In
applying its balancing test, the Court held that despite the "high
responsibility"4 1 Wisconsin has in the formal education of it citizens,4 2 the state's infringement on the claimants' religious beliefs
was overly burdensome and unjustifiable.4 3 In arriving at its conclusion, the Court realized that the judiciary must be flexible in its
review of religious freedoms and should explore alternative regulatory means that could satisfy its interests without hindering the
practice of religion.4 4 The Court further noted that the Amish had
convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs,4 5
31 Id. at 403. After finding that the South Carolina statute substantially infringed upon
the plaintiff's free exercise rights, the Court shifted its analysis to consider whether there
was a "compelling state interest." Id. at 406-09.
"' Id. at 407. The Court stated that even if there is a legitimate finding of a compelling
state interest, it is still "incumbent upon the [state] to demonstrate that no alternative
forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights."
Id.
38 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
"' See supra notes 27-29, 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing balancing test
adopted by Court).
40 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
41 Id. at 213.
42 Id. The Court commented that the state has a "high" responsibility in providing a

public education for its citizens for this "ranks at the very apex of the function of a State."
Id.
43 Id. at 215-34. The Court stated that only interests of "the highest order . . . can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id. at 215. The Court then
noted that although a state's interest in compulsory education is strong, it is "by no means
absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests." Id.
" Id. at 235. The Court noted that "courts must move with great circumspection in
performing the sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social concern
when faced with religious claims for exemption from generally applicable educational requirements." Id.
45 Id. at 210-17, 235. The Amish believe that "salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence." Id. at 210. In reaching its
decision, the Yoder Court relied on the fact that the Amish have a history as a self-sufficient
religious sect. Id. at 235. The Court recognized that the traditional life of the Amish is not
only a matter of choice, but one of "deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group,
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that these beliefs played a vital role in their daily conduct 6 and
that they significantly affected the survival of the Amish community.47 Also instrumental in the Court's decision was the ability of

the Amish to demonstrate that their informal mode of vocational
education effectively achieved Wisconsin's "compelling interest" in
compulsory education.' 8
In applying the free exercise analysis developed by the Supreme Court as refined in Sherbert,'49 most courts agree that a regulation that merely diminishes the amount of revenue that a religious organization would otherwise have available for religious
purposes is not viewed as a substantial burden on the free exercise
of religion.50 This position suggests that any religiously neutral law
and intimately related to daily living," which regulates and directes every aspect of their
lives. Id. at 216.
48 Id. at 210-35. The Amish object to formal education beyond the eighth grade because
they believe that while a certain level of education is necessary, additional public education
exposes their children to influences which contrast with Amish values. Id. Specifically, they
believe that the increased emphasis on competition and peer pressure from non-Amish children would affect the Amish child during his most formative years, and these years are
crucial to the Amish if they are to survive as a sect. Id.
47Id. The Court concluded that the Amish were able to prove "the vital role that belief
and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities." Id. at
235.
'" Id. at 221, 234. In Yoder, the compelling interest in compulsory education asserted
by the state was based on the belief that some degree of education is necessary to prepare
citizens to participate intelligently in the political system, and to allow them to remain economically self-sufficient. Id. at 221. However, the Court found that allowing the Amish to
forego two years of compulsory education would not impair this compelling state interest.
Id. at 234. This determination was supported by the fact that the Amish demonstrated the
adequacy of their alternative lifestyle of informal education in achieving "precisely those
overall interests that the State advances in support of its program of compulsory high school
education." Id. at 235.
'9 See Comment, FirstAmendment Challenges to Landmark PreservationStatutes, 11
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 132-37 (1982). One commentator suggests that the Sherbert balancing test should be used to resolve free exercise of religion controversies arising from the
application of landmark preservation statutes to religious institutions. See id. at 134-35.
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595
(1990), apparently narrowed the reach of the Sherbert balancing test. See infra notes 61-64
and accompanying text.
50 See Jimmy Swaggart v. Board of Equalization, 110 S.Ct. 688, 696 (1990). In Swaggart, the Jimmy Swaggart Ministry contended that their free exercise rights had been violated due to a general tax law on the retail sale of personal property. Id. at 693. The Ministry, which sold religious books, tapes, and magazines, claimed that this tax resulted in less
revenue for religious pursuits and was in violation of their first amendment rights. Id. at
696. Rejecting this argument, the Court stated, "to the extent that imposition of a generally
applicable tax merely decreases the amount of money appellant has to spend on its religious
activities, any such burden is not constitutionally significant." Id. The Court noted that the
tax law in question was not different than other general laws and regulations such as those
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of general application, not taken to its harsh extreme" and which
merely reduces revenue available for religious activities, would not
place a constitutionally impermissible burden on the free exercise
of religion. 2 Therefore, under such a view, it would appear that a
state would not be required to show a compelling state interest to
support a regulation that has such an effect.5 3 Consequently, if the
sole burden placed on a religious organization due to a landmark
statute is a decrease in potential revenue, a valid free exercise
claim would not exist.
In the recent decision of Employment Division v. Smith,54 the
Supreme Court restricted the application of the Sherbert "compelling state interest" test 55 and suggested that a generally applicable
religion-neutral standard be followed.5 6 In Smith, the Court examined whether an Oregon statute criminalizing the use of peyote
was constitutional as applied to Native Americans who ingested
the drug as part of their religious rites. 57 In finding the statute condesigned to promote health or safety. See id. at 697; see also Hernandez v. Commissioner,
490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989) (denial of charitable deduction under Internal Revenue Code for
religious training payments not unconstitutional); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260
(1982) (requirement that Amish pay Social Security tax not violative of free exercise of
religion); Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 30708 (6th Cir.) (financial imposition of local ordinance on congregation held not to violate free
exercise clause), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
51 Swaggart, 110 S. Ct. at 697. The Swaggart Court suggested that if a law is too extreme in its effect, it may be discriminatory. Id.; see Murdock v. Pennslyvania, 319 U.S. 105,
115 (1943) (burden of flat tax could have effect on evangelism "crush[ing] and clos[ing] [it]
out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted town by town").
52 See Swaggart, 110 S. Ct. at 697.
53 See Record of Oral Argument on Appeal at 7-9, St. Bartholomew's v. City of New
York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-7751, 90-7101) [hereinafter Record of Oral Argument on Appeal]. Judge Winter of the Second Circuit stated that when applying the compelling state interest test, the first step is to examine whether there is a substantial burden
on the party's free exercise of religion. Id. at 7-8. Thus, a court would first resolve whether
the "disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of ... religion."
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. If the court concludes that a burden exists, the court must determine whether there is a compelling state interest to justify the burden imposed. Id. at 406.
:4 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
7 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597-99. The respondents, Native Americans, were fired
from their jobs due to their ingestion of peyote pursuant to their religion and were subsequently denied unemployment benefits due to dismissal for work-related "misconduct." Id.
at 1598. On remand from the United States Supreme Court to determine whether such religious use was permissible within the Controlled Substance Law, the Oregon Supreme Court
held that although the use of peyote was a criminal offense, the prohibition was an unconstitutional infringement on the respondent's free exercise of religion. Id.

1991]

RELIGIOUS LANDMARK PRESERVATION

stitutional, 5 the Court dismissed the respondent's free exercise
claim by stating that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law
of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'"
Further, the Court implied that if the restriction on religious practices was not the object of a law but merely an incidental effect of
a general, otherwise valid, religion-neutral provision, first amendment rights would not be violated."' As for the Sherbert "compel58See id. at 1606. The Court acknowledged that many states have made an exception
to their drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote, but concluded that since such use is
prohibited under Oregon law, and the prohibition is not an unconstitutional violation of the
free exercise of religion, the claimants' application for unemployment compensation could
be denied based on a dismissal for the peyote use. Id.
1 Id. at 1600 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). The Court
suggested that this analytical framework was consistent with prior judicial approaches to
free exercise analysis. Id. The Court observed that it "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct
that the State is free to regulate." Id. However, not all of the Justices were in agreement.
See id. at 1606-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 1615-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor rendered a stinging criticism of the majority's restriction of the "compelling
state interest" test by remarking that the Court's approach was clearly inconsistent in light
of prior precedent. Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor contended that
a balancing test was necessary for, "[a]s the language of the Clause itself makes clear, an
individual's free exercise of religion is a preferred constitutional activity" and therefore, a
law that criminalizes this activity, demands a balancing test. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Further, Justice O'Connor analogized free exercise cases to those involving freedom of
speech, where a balancing test based on individual merits, rather than a categorical "generally applicable law" rule, is applied. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor took
particular exception to the majority's conclusion that "disfavoring minority religions is an
'unavoidable consequence' under our system of government and that accomodation of such
religions must be left to the political process," and asserted that the first amendment was
enacted particularly for the reason of protecting minority religious practices. Id. at 1613
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Finally, in applying the "compelling state interest" test, Justice
O'Connor determined that Oregon's interest in controlling drug usage and abuse was compelling enough to uphold such a uniform rule necessary to accomplish this goal. Id. at 1614
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, voiced a particularly strong opposition to the majority
viewpoint, arguing that, despite the fact that the Court had an established procedure for
analyzing free exercise issues, the "majority ... perfunctorily dismisse[d] it as a 'constitutional anomaly.'" Id. at 1615-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11 See id. at 1600. The Court stated that "if [the] prohibiti[on] [of] the exercise of
religion ... [was] not the object of the tax [or religiously neutral law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment
[would] not [have] been offended." Id. Compare Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,
394 U.S. 131, 139 (1989) (upholding application of antitrust laws as applied to press) with
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (striking down license tax applied only to newspapers with weekly circulation above specified level).
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ling state interest" balancing test,6 ' the Court restricted its application to two instances: (1) cases involving the denial of
unemployment compensation or other similar individual governmental assessment;6 2 and (2) "hybrid" cases"'-those involving free
exercise claims in conjunction with the denial of other constitutional rights. 4
The Smith Court's reason for applying a "generally applicable
neutral law" standard was that the government's ability to enforce
prohibitions against socially harmful conduct should not depend
on weighing the effect of a general law against a religious objector's
"spiritual development. 6 The Court further noted that even if
the right to ignore generally applicable laws was limited to those
situations in which the otherwise prohibited conduct is central to
an objector's religion, this would result in judicially improper explorations into the centrality of beliefs and rituals within religious

faiths. 6
Although Smith addressed a criminal statute's infringement
61 See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
62 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602-04. The Court stated that aside from the denial of
unemployment compensation claims, the Sherbert test had never been used to invalidate
any governmental action taken to achieve a compelling state interest. See id. at 1602. The
Court cited Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), Thomas v.
Review Bd., Indiana Employment Division 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), as three occasions in which it had invalidated state unemployment compensation rules on the grounds that they conditioned the availability of benefits on "an applicant's willingness to work under conditions forbidden by his religion." Id. at 1602-04. Although the Court was noncommittal, it did suggest that the Sherbert analysis may also
survive in similar situations involving "individualized governmental assessment[s]." Id. at
1603.
63 See Record of Oral Argument on Appeal, supra note 53, at 14-15.
" See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601. As an example, the Court examined the free exercise
clause coupled with free speech and freedom of the press. Id.; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943) (flat license tax to solicit literature as applied to Jehovah's
Witnesses impinged upon free exercise of press and religion).
65 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597, 1603. The Smith Court stressed that it did not want judges
to have to value and weigh the centrality of conduct to individual religions. Id. at 1604. For
this reason, the Court found it impractical to apply the Sherbert test to situations where
litigants claim that the conduct prohibited is central to their religion. Id. Noting that the
people of this nation have diverse religious beliefs and practices, the Court held that it
"cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order."
Id. at 1605 (emphasis in original). Based on this reasoning, the Court proposed that a generally applicable neutral law standard should be appled in situations similar to Smith. Id. at
1604.
66 See id. at 1604.
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upon the exercise of religion,67 this "generally applicable" standard
arguably could appear to reach all types of neutral, nondiscriminatory statutes that may infringe on the free exercise of religion.6
Therefore, in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, if a
landmark statute can be characterized as a general, religion-neutral nondiscriminatory law, its effect on a religious institution
would be judged under the Smith standard. However, it should be
noted that this standard might prove inapplicable if the first
amendment challenge is accompanied by a valid fifth amendment
takings claim,69 in which case a "compelling state interest" standard should be utilized.

II.

GOVERNMENT TAKINGS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

In addition to challenges under the first amendment free exercise clause, landmark preservation laws have also come in conflict
with the fifth amendment takings clause, which guarantees that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. 0 In order to resolve any fifth amendment conflict
properly, the Court has viewed land use restrictions in light of the
individual property in question.71
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
constitutionality of the takings clause as applied to the landmarking of religious or charitable institutions,7 2 it has examined this issue in a commercial context. In Penn Central TransportationCo.
v. New York City,7 8 a fifth amendment takings issue arose concerning Grand Central Terminal's designation as an historic landmark
by the New York Landmark Commission in 1967. 71 As a result of
67

See id. at 1597.

68 See

id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor suggested that although

the law in question was a criminal statute, the effect of the Smith decision would be to
apply this analysis to all generally applicable laws. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 4. The takings clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago B. & Q. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
71 See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (general zoning law must be
applied to particular property at issue to determine whether unconstitutional taking resulted); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185-87 (1928) (constitutional effect of
zoning ordinance must be examined in light of land in question).
72 See Note, Historic PreservationOrdinances, 63 N.C.L. REv. 404, 418 (1985) (Supreme Court has never addressed takings issue arising from land use regulation of church
property).
73

438 U.S. 104 (1978).

71

See id. at 115-16. The Commission's report stated that the Grand Central Terminal
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such a designation, Penn Central Transportation Co. ("Penn Central") became responsible for maintaining the building in good repair and receiving approval from the Landmark Commission
before making any alterations. 5 A controversy arose, however,
when the Commission refused to allow Penn Central to construct a
fifty-five-story office building above the terminal. 8 In justifying its
decision, the Commission argued that the new building would clash
with the terminal's Beaux-Arts facade." In upholding the constitutionality of the New York Landmark Preservation statute, the
Penn Central Court found that New York City's objective in preserving its special historic, cultural, and architectural structures to
be a legitimate governmental undertaking. 78 In addition, unlike
spot zoning, 9 the Court viewed the landmark law as a generally
applicable and nondiscriminatory law.80
"evoke[d] a spirit that is unique in ...

[New York City]" and that its architecture "rep-

resent[ed] the best of the French Beaux Arts." Id. at 116 n.16.
" See supra notes 14-16 (describing owner's duty under New York City landmark statute). See generally Comment, supra note 49, at 119-24 (overview of New York Landmark
Preservation Law).
" See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116-19. In 1968, Penn Central "entered into a renewable 50 year lease and sublease agreement with appellant UGP Properties, Inc. (UGP), a
wholly owned subsidiary of United General Properties, Ltd.... [wherein] UGP was to construct a multistory office building above the Terminal." Id. at 116.
11 See id. at 117-18. The Commission stated that while there was no rule against making alteration to structures designated as landmarks, the proposal to construct an office
tower above the Terminal "seems nothing more that an aesthetic joke [because] . . . the
tower would overwhelm the Terminal by its sheer mass.., and would reduce the Landmark
itself to the status of a curiosity." Id. at 118.
78 See id. at 129. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the power of states and municipalities to regulate land use to preserve the character and special quality of a community.
See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (Court upheld local economic
regulation aimed at increasing number of visitors to tourist attraction); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (Court upheld zoning ordinance restricting land use to
one-family dwellings); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (Court upheld redevelopment act aimed at eliminating substandard housing conditions).
79 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132. The Court defined "reverse spot" zoning as "a
land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for different, less favorable
treatment than the neighboring ones." Id. See generally Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 9-44 (1988) (analyzing discriminatory land regulation).
"o See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132. In Penn Central, New York City's Landmark
Preservation Law was viewed as a comprehensive plan to preserve the buildings of aesthetic
interest in the city. Id. As the Court noted, at the time of the decision, there were over four
hundred landmarks and thirty-one historic districts represented under the plan. Id. However, the appellants argued that the landmark statute was discriminatory because of its impact on designated landowners. Id. at 132-33. While the Court conceded that the law had
greater impact on certain landowners, it emphasized that "[this] in itself does not mean that
the law effects a 'taking.'" Id. at 133. The Court advanced three reasons for justifying its
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In determining whether a taking had occurred, the Penn Central Court identified three significant factors: (1) the character of
the governmental action; (2) the extent to which the governmental
action interfered with the claimant's "investment backed expectations"; and (3) the economic impact of the governmental action on
the claimant."' In weighing "the character of the governmental action," the Court explained that a greater possibility of a taking exists when the government has physically invaded the property. 2 In
analyzing the extent to which the governmental action interfered
with the claimant's "investment backed expectations," the Court
appeared to imply that no reasonable expectations will be found to
exist where the governmental action was foreseeable.8 3 In resolving
the "economic impact of the governmental action" factor, the
Penn Central Court determined that a taking does not depend
upon how much the landmark statute diminishes the value of the
designated property, but rather upon whether the property is still
suitable for an economically viable purpose after the landmark
designation.84
decision: first, the Court reasoned that "[l]egislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than others." Id. Second, the Court compared the
Landmark Preservation statute to zoning laws by recognizing zoning laws as valid exercises
of legislative authority, despite the disparate impact of such laws' upon selected parties. Id.
at 134. Last, the Court stated that although the appellant had been burdened by the
landmark designation, designated landowners also benefit in that the Commission's act had
the effect of "improving the quality of life in the city as a whole." Id.
81Id. at 124; see Peterson, Land Use Regulatory Takings Revisited: The New Supreme
Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 339-52 (1988) (analysis of three factors discussed
in Penn Central).
82 See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124. "A 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government ....
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life .

. . ."

Id.; see, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987) (statute

prohibiting devise of certain types of land to one's heirs constituted taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (physical occupation of private
property constitutes taking per se).
83 See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (employers had sufficient notice of ERISA regulation and that "withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial obligations"); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto & Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006 (1984)
(Monsanto aware of EPA's disclosure policy pursuant to statute). The Court in Penn Central examined the foreseeability of the effect of the landmark statute in light of the investment-backed expectations of Grand Central Terminal. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
The Court, in reaching its decision, reasoned that in the last fifty years, there has been an
influx of landmark preservation measures in the United States. Id. at 107. This would imply
that the Court believed the owners of Grand Central Terminal had sufficient notice that
their property might be the subject of a landmark designation. See id.
84 See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 129-31, 138 n.36. The Court rejected the proposition
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Upon applying these principles to the facts of Penn Central,
the Court stressed that the landmark designation did not prohibit
the continuation of the current use of the terminal8 5 and that Penn
Central was not deprived of the ability to realize a "reasonable return" on its investment without the erection of the office
6
building.8
Although commentators 87 are in disagreement as to the specific test applicable in resolving "takings" claims, the Supreme
Court has implied that the factors set forth 8 in Penn Central are
applicable when a taking is premised on land use regulation rather
than physical invasions.8 9 However, the regulation in question
must substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest and
must not deny the owner of the economically viable use of his
land.9 0 In recent years, the Court has gone even further in restrictthat diminished property value alone is sufficient to constitute a "taking." Id. at 131. Further, the Court found that Penn Central could still "earn[] a reasonable return." Id. at 129.
The Court also noted that its decision did not preclude Penn Central from receiving relief in
the future if the circumstances demonstrated that, because of the restrictions, the present
use of the terminal was no longer "economically viable." Id. at 138 n.36.
85Id. at 136.
88 Id. at 136-38. The Court stated: "[W]e must regard the New York City law as pemitting Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a 'reasonable
return' on its investment." Id. at 136. Of additional importance in the Court's analysis was
that Penn Central could still generate excess income by selling the air rights above the
terminal since such sale could be seen to "mitigate whatever financial burdens the law imposed on the appellants and, for that reason, [were] to be taken into account in considering
the impact of regulation." Id. at 137. The Court also emphasized the fact that the Commission did not prohibit building above the terminal, but merely prohibited the construction of
this particular office building. Id.
87 See Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A
Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1299, 1316-33 (1989) [hereinafter Peterson, The Takings Clause]. Professor Peterson noted that the Supreme Court
has used four different methods of analysis in resolving "takings" issues: (1) the three-prong
Penn Central test; (2) the two-part test of whether the regulation substantially advances a
legitimate state interest and is economically viable; (3) the "no economically viable use"
test; and (4) the Loretto per se rule. Id. at 1316; see also Peterson, supra note 81, at 339-56
(analyzing Penn Central factors and applying them to two-part test); Note, Taking A Step
Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
102 HARv. L. REv. 448, 449-65 (1988) (suggesting that cause-effect test is inefficient and
unfair).
88See Peterson, supra note 81, at 340. The Supreme Court has implied that the relative weight assigned to the three Penn Central factors will vary depending on the facts of
each case. Id.; see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984) (interference with investment-backed expectations not dominant factor under facts presented).
88 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
80 See id. at 260-61. The Agins Court noted that although no precise test exists, a taking has occurred when the legitimate state interest has not been advanced by the land regulation or when the land regulation acts to deny an owner the economically viable use of his
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ing governmental rights to regulate or control private property9 ' by
requiring that in order for a government regulation to avoid being
considered a taking, there must be a close relationship between the
means chosen to restrict an owner's use of his land and the governmental interest sought to be advanced. 2 Previously, the Court had
required only a minimal relationship. 9
Although Penn Central was decided in a commercial, revenue
generating context, its holding is not unrelated to takings claims
involving religious or charitable institutions. In such a situation,
the Penn Central test for economic viability could be modified to
focus on whether the charitable or religious use of the property, as
evidenced by past practice, could reasonably be expected to continue despite the landmark designation. Such a modification is justified because the purpose of a religious or charitable institution
land. Id. at 260. This analysis requires weighing both public and private interests. Id. at 261;
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 ("use restriction on real property may constitute 'taking' if
not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose").
It has been argued that different tests are to be applied when the statute is challenged
as facially unconstitutional, or unconstitutional "as applied" to the particular claimant. See
Peterson, The Takings Clause, supra note 87, at 1360-61. It appears, however, that the
Supreme Court has applied Agins in cases involving a taking where a legitimate state interest was not being advanced by the land regulation and where the regulation acted to deny
the owner the economically viable use of his land. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). In Nollan, the Court relied on both Penn Central and Agins to
determine that conditioning a public rebuilding permit on the private grant of an easement
constituted a taking without just compensation. Id. at 838-42. This suggests that the three
factors discussed in Penn Central should be analyzed in a way that is consistent with the
Agins test. See infra notes 92-93.
" See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (land use regulation must have close nexus regarding governmental means and ends); First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304, 319-22 (1987) (property owner can recover damages for period of unconstitutional taking between enactment and invalidation of regulation).
02 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. The Nollan Court had to determine whether a California
statute, which allowed the state to place restrictions on the rebuilding of existing singlefamily coastal houses, and which as applied, required the private owner to grant a public
easement in return for permission to rebuild, resulted in a taking. Id. at 827-28. In determining whether a taking existed, the Court noted that the regulation must have a close fit
between the condition substituted for the provision and the end advanced as the justification for the provision or the regulation would be deemed unconstitutional. Id. at 837. The
Court determined that a taking resulted from the regulation because the required nexus
between the means chosen and the ends advanced was lacking. Id. at 836-40.
03 Id. at 842-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that the court's strict
nexus standard was inconsistent with prior precedent. Id. at 843. According to Justice Brennan, precedent required only that the state's exercise of its police power be rational. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, a land use regulation passes constitutional muster if the
"'State could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's
objective." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)) (emphasis in Clover Leaf).
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differs from a commercial institution's usual purpose of generating
94
revenue.
III.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN St.

Bartholomew's
A.

St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York

Recently, in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 5
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed with a challenge to the constitutionality of the New York
City landmark preservation statute as it applied to St. Bartholomew's Church. 8 St. Bartholomew's Church was organized in 1835
as a not-for-profit religious corporation.9 7 The structures housing
this religious corporation consist of a house of worship, which was
constructed in 1917 and an adjacent building, known as the Community House, which was completed in 1928.98 The Community
House is used for many of the social and religious activites in
which St. Bartholomew's is engaged. 9 In 1967, the New York
Landmark Commission designated both buildings landmarks. 100
Significantly such a designation prohibits the alteration, reconstruction, or demolition of any part of the designated building
without the consent of the Commission. 10 1
"' See Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314,
316 (1st Dep't 1968). In Platt, the New York Appellate Division, First Department stated
that while an owner of commercial property seeks an adequate return on his property, a
charitable institution has different expectations. Id. The Platt court went on to note that
when examining a charitable institution, the test should be whether the regulation "physically or financially prevents or seriously interferes with carrying out the charitable purpose."
Id.; see Comment, supra note 49, at 123-26 (New York courts apply modified standard for
takings claims involving charitable institutions).
914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3433 (March 4, 1991).
9' See id. at 351-53; infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
'
See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 351.
8 Id.
" Id.
The Community House contained a preschool, theater, athletic facilities, meeting
rooms, and other offices. Id. Meals were prepared for the homeless from a pantry located in
the Community House. Id.
100 Id. The Church did not object at the time of the designation. Id. The Commission
commented that "St. Bartholomew's Church and Community House have a special character, special historical and aesthetic interest and value as part of the development, heritage
and cultural aspects of New York City." Id. Prominent features of the Church included its
octagonal dome, large rose window, and polychromatic stone exterior. Id.
101Id.; see NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-301(a)(1) (1986); supra notes 1416 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 49, at 120 (failure to maintain or
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In December of 1983, the Church filed a certificate of appropriateness with the Commission for permission to demolish the
Community House and build in its place a fifty-nine-story office
building. 10 2 However, this request was denied. 10 3 In December of
1984, the Church again sought approval to demolish the Community House; this time with the stated purpose of erecting a fortyseven-story office building. 04 The Church was again unsuccessful.10 5 Following this attempt, the Church tried to circumvent this
denial through a procedure known as the "hardship exception,"' 1 6
arguing that the Community House was no longer suitable for the
Church's purposes. 0 7 Although St. Bartholomew's maintained that
the new office tower would house many of the Church's programs
and generate revenue critical to their survival, 0 8 the Commission
refused its request on the ground that the Church failed to prove
the necessary degree of hardship. 0 9
In April of 1986, unsatisfied with the Commission's rulings,
the Church sought declaratory relief on the grounds that the
landmark preservation statute was unconstitutional on its face and
repair subjects owner to criminal penalties under landmark law).
102 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 351; see NEW YORK,N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25307 (1986). When an owner of a designated structure files a certificate of appropriateness,
the Commission determines whether the proposed change is consistent with the landmark
designation. Id. § 25-307(a). In deciding whether to grant permission to reconstruct, alter, or
demolish, the emphasis is on how the proposed change will effect the exterior of the
landmarked features and the features of neighboring structures. Id. § 25-307(b)(1).
103 St. Bartholomew's Church, 914 F.2d at 351. The request was denied as an "inappropriate alteration." Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.

106 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-309(a)(2)(c) (1986). The "hardship exception" provides that a certificate of appropriateness shall be granted for a not-for-profit applicant if the applicant can show that such structure "has ceased to be adequate, suitable or
appropriate for useful carrying out both (1) the purposes of such owner to which it is devoted and (2) those purposes to which it had been devoted when acquired unless such owner
is not [sic] longer engaged in pursuing such purposes." Id.
107See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 352.
100 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 7-9. The Church argued that the amount
of space in the Community House was unsuitable for their needs. Id. at 7. The Church
further asserted that its ministry and charitable programs had been severely curtailed due
to a lack of revenue. Id. at 8; St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 357.
10 See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 352. Before making its determination, the Commission held a series of public hearings in which they gathered evidence and testimony from
numerous interested parties. Id. The data gathered included evidence of needed structural
and mechanical repairs to the Church and Community House, as well as reports of the
Church's financial condition. Id.
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as applied to St. Bartholomew's Church. 110 In challenging the constitutionality of the statute and the Commission's ruling, the
Church relied on two grounds. First, the Church maintained that
the "Landmarks Law, facially and as applied to the Church, violate[d] . . . the free exercise [clause] . . . of the First Amendment.""-" Second, the Church alleged that the Commission's application of the statute constituted a taking of property without just
112
compensation in violation of the fifth amendment takings clause.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted summary judgment against the Church on the
facially unconstitutional claims' 13 and after a bench trial, it denied
the Church's as-applied-to claims' 1 4 on the ground that the Church
had failed to demonstrate that the Community House was inadequate for the Church's purposes or that the Church was unable to
5
afford the necessary repairs.1
On appeal, the Church renewed its claims that the regulation
violated the free exercise clause and resulted in an unconstitutional "taking." 1 6 However, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the Landmark Preservation statute was not unconstitutional as applied to St. Barthol1lOId.
111 Id.
112

Id.

113

St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 962-63 (S.D.N.Y.

1989), af'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990). The district court rejected the Church's assertion
that the statute abridged its first amendment right to free exercise of religion. Id. at 963.
The court reasoned that the mere possibility that the Church may desire to use its property
in a different manner placed nothing more than an incidental burden on religion. Id. The
district court further explained that the Church would not be deprived of its right to try to
alter the property in the future. Id. In addition, the court found that the landmark law did
not infringe upon equal protection or procedural due process rights. Id. at 963-65. Thus, the
district court granted summary judgment of St. Bartholomew's' claim that the statute was
facially unconstitutional as to all churches. Id. at 965.
114 Id.
at 965-75. The free exercise as-applied-to claim was based on the denial of St.
Bartholomew's' hardship application under the Landmark Preservation statute. Id. at 965.
In addition, the Church argued that the denial of its application had the effect of stopping
St. Bartholomew's from carrying out its religious purpose, and thus constituted a "taking"
of its property without just compensation. Id.
125 Id.
at 966, 972. The district court stated that for any constitutional claim to prevail,
there must be a finding that the Church could no longer carry out its charitable purpose. Id.
at 966. The district court reviewed repair costs of the Community House and the financial
condition of the Church and concluded that St. Bartholomew's had failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that it could not carry out its religious and charitable purposes in its existing facilities. Id. at 967-75.
"" St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 350-51.
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omew's Church. 117

In addressing the free exercise issue, the Second Circuit
stressed that the Supreme Court has indicated that government
regulation "may restrict certain activities associated with the practice of religion pursuant to its general regulatory powers."11 Utilizing the Supreme Court's analysis in Smith,"19 the Second Circuit
remarked on the "critical distinction.., between a neutral, generally applicable law that happens to bear on religiously motivated
action, and a regulation that restricts certain conduct because it is
religiously oriented."' 20 Determining that the landmark law was a
"facially neutral regulation of general applicability", 21 the St. Bartholomew's court concluded that although the law effectively restricted the Church's ability to generate funds, this standing alone
did not implicate a free exercise violation. 22 In fact, according to
the court, absent either discrimination against the Church's ability
to practice religion or coercion regarding such practice or beliefs,
1 23
the landmark law was not violative of the free exercise clause.
In examining the "takings" claim, the Second Circuit applied
24
the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Penn Central.
However, the court concluded that when applying the Penn Central test to a charitable organization, the central question should
not be whether the property provides a reasonable return, but
"whether the land-use regulation impairs the continued operation
of the property in its originally expected use. "125 Under this modi117

Id. at 351.

118 Id. at 354. The Second Circuit reasoned that although the government cannot coerce
or punish individuals for their religious beliefs, it can limit some activities related to the
practice of religion under its general police powers. See id.
19 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
120 See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354. The Second Circuit conceded that a law
regulating religious beliefs, as opposed to conduct, would be an unconstitutional infringement on the free exercise of religion. Id.
121 Id. The court relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in Penn Central. Id. at 355.
122 Id. The Second Circuit relied in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Commissioner, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990). Id.
123 Id.; see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1326
(1988) (incidental effects of government programs that do not result in coercing individuals
to act against religious beliefs do not require state to prove compelling justification for regulatory action).
124 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 356-60; see supra notes 81-86 and accompanying
text.
125 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 356. The Second Circuit took into account the Penn
Central rationale that despite the landmark designation of Grand Central Terminal, its
owner could still use the property as it had in the past, and more importantly, was still able
to earn a reasonable return on its investment. Id.
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fled analysis, the court conluded that the landmark law, as applied
to St. Bartholomew's, did not result in an unlawful taking because,
in the court's determination, the Church could continue its historical, religious, and charitable activities in the Community House as
12 6
it presently existed.

B. The Second Circuit's Free Exercise Analysis in St.
Bartholomew's
In addressing the free exercise issue in St. Bartholomew's, it
would appear that the Second Circuit correctly relied on the newer
Smith 27 analysis rather than the more traditional "compelling
state interest" test refined in Sherbert.128 In Smith, the Supreme
Court determined that the Sherbert analysis was limited either to
free exercise cases within the unemployment compensation context
involving individual governmental assessment 129 or to free exercise
cases involving an independent constitutional concern.13 0 As will be
discussed below, St. Bartholomew's Church failed to raise a valid
fifth amendment "takings" claim, and as a result, the Second Cir126 Id. The Second Circuit, in discussing the economic effect of the designation on St.
Bartholomew's, recognized the distinction between a not-for-profit organization and a commercial one. Id. at 357. The Second Circuit also noted that although the Landmark Preservation statute may "freeze" the Community House in its current use, under the analysis in
Penn Central, this is permissible even though St. Bartholomew's would effectively be prevented from expanding or altering its activities under the designation. Id. at 356. Thus, the
Second Circuit seemed to focus on whether St. Bartholomew's could continue to use the
property to house its charitable and religious programs in a manner consistent with past
experience. See id. at 357. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court's determination that the Church did not sufficiently prove that the Community House was insufficient
for the needs of the Church. Id. at 357-58.
121 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1595; see supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
128 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398; see supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
1
See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603. The Smith Court suggested that the reason it applied
the compelling state interest analysis in Sherbert was that the situation "lent itself to individualized governmental assessments of the reasons for the relevant conduct." Id. The
Smith Court hinted that under similar circumstances, the Sherbert test might again be
used. Id. The Court, however, was not clear as to what would fall under this similar criteria.
See id.
1"0 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601. The Smith Court explained that an exception to the
generally applicable standard exists when the first amendment concern is considered in conjunction with another constitutional claim, for example, the right of parents to direct the
education of their children. Id. In support of this position, the Court cited Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972), which clearly relied on the Sherbert "compelling state interest" test. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601 n.1. Thus, in such "hybrid matters," the Court seems
to have conceded that the proper analysis would be to apply a substantial burden/compelling state interest test. Id. at 1601.
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cuit's application of Smith was correct."3 '

Under Smith, the "right to free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law
of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."'' 1
Under this view, if New York's landmark statute is defined as a
law of general applicability that is valid and nondiscriminatory, it
would not constitute an unconstitutional infringement on the free
exercise of religion. 1 33 Relying on the Supreme Court's language in

Penn Central, the Second Circuit determined that New York's
landmark law was in fact general, neutral, and nondiscriminatory. 34 Based on this determination, the Second Circuit concluded
that, notwithstanding the restriction placed on the Church, which
prohibited the erection of an office building in place of the
Church's Community House, New York's landmark statute did not
violate the free exercise clause. 35
See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
132See Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1600. The Smith Court reasoned that to excuse a person's
violation of the law, based on the free exercise of religion, would permit religious practices
to be "superior to the law of the land and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself." Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)).
"'

133Id.
4 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 355; see Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132-34 (Court
concluded that New York Landmark Preservation statute was general, comprehensive, nondiscriminatory plan repesenting legitimate state objective).
35St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 355-56. In a decision prior to Smith, one court applied the "compelling state interest" test to strike down a landmark statute. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash. 2d 392, 401-10, 787 P.2d 1352, 1356-61 (1990) (en
banc). In First Covenant, the Supreme Court of Washington was faced with a free exercise
challenge to Seattle's Landmark Preservation statute. Id. at 394-95, 787 P.2d at 1353. Using
the Sherbert analysis, the FirstCovenant court found that the statute was unconstitutional
as applied to religious structures, since the statute placed a substantial burden on the free
exercise of religion and did not promote a compelling state interest. Id. at 405-10, 787 P.2d
at 1359-61.
Justice Utter, concurring, noted that in light of Swaggart,handed down after First Covenant was argued, the emphasis should have been on whether the substantial burden on the
exercise of religion was met by the severe diminuition of appraisal value resulting from the
landmarking. Id. at 412-14, 787 P.2d at 1363-64 (Utter, J., concurring).
It is submitted that the reasoning under First Covenant is inappropriate to the facts of
St. Bartholomew's for several reasons. First, in light of Smith, the Sherbert analysis is arguably no longer applicable to landmark preservation cases involving religious structures.
See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (discussion of Smith and Sherbert). Also,
under Swaggart, it appears that the free exercise of religion is not violated by a generally
applicable law, the sole effect of which is financial burden. In St. Bartholomew's, there was
no evidence that the market value of the church had any effect on the church's ability to
carry out its religious mission, and therefore no "substantial" burden was found. Lastly,
even if a substantial burden had been found, landmark preservation appears to be a compel-
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The Second Circuit's Takings Analysis in St. Bartholomew's

A regulation dealing with land use does not constitute an unconstitutional taking if it substantially advances a legitimate governmental interest and does not deny the owner economically viable use of his land.3 6 However, whenever such regulation is
attempted, there must be a tight fit between the means chosen by
the government and the objective being promoted. 1' 7 To assess
properly whether a regulation constitutes a taking, the three factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in Penn Central must be
applied: (1) the character of the government action; (2) the extent
to which the government action interferes with the claimant's investment backed expectations; and (3) the economic impact of the
government action on the claimant.3 8' It is important to note that
the Second Circuit in St. Bartholomew's placed importance upon
the Penn Central Court's finding that the New York landmarks
statute is nondiscriminatory and part of a comprehensive plan to
promote government's interest* in preserving historical structures.'
Further, the Second Circuit, relying on language from
Penn Central, determined that New York's landmark law did not
interfere with St. Bartholomew's historical expectations of the
property's use,' 40 in that the existing buildings were deemed sufficient to maintain the religious and charitable programs they
housed in the past.' 4 ' Additionally, the Second Circuit properly
modified the economic impact factor to account for the differences
between a nonprofit charitable organization and a commercial enterprise. 142 In fact, New York state courts have developed a "takings" standard for charitable organizations that examines whether
the landmark designation of the property owned by the charitable
organization prevents or seriously interferes with the accomplishment of the institution's charitable purpose. 43 For the institution
ling state interest under Penn Central and suitably tailored under Nollan.
"I Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
13 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
I Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
139 See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132.
110 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 356. The Second Circuit found that St. Bartholomew's could continue its existing charitable pursuits in the Community House as it existed.

Id.

141

Id. at 357.

14 See id.
1,3 Society for Ethical Culture v. Spratt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 454-55, 415 N.E.2d 922, 925,
434 N.Y.S.2d 932, 935 (1980) (reasonable return standard adapted to charitable organiza-
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to prevail under this standard, it must prove that it can no longer
carry out its charitable mission in its existing facilities. 4 4 Finally,
in accordance with prior Supreme Court case law, 145 a substantial
nexus existed between New York's landmark statute, as the means
chosen, and the preservation of New York City's historical and architectural culture, as the government's end.' 4 6 Therefore, the Second Circuit was correct in its analysis of St. Bartholomew's fifth
amendment takings claim.
CONCLUSION

Landmark preservation statutes are aimed at achieving the
important government objective of maintaining the historical, aesthetic, and cultural atmosphere of a community. However, such
statutes often raise constitutional questions under the fifth amendment takings clause in that they restrict the use and enjoyment of
privately owned property. This problem takes on even greater constitutional significance when the restricted owners are religious institutions due to the first amendment free exercise clause.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutional ramifications of landmarking religious structures, recent decisions by the Court suggest that if a landmark preservation statute is religiously neutral and generally applicable, it will not
constitute a violation of the first amendment free exercise clause.
Furthermore, while the Court does not currently have a black letter test to determine when the regulation of land use constitutes a
governmental taking, the proper analysis appears to be the application of a balancing test that weighs the effect of the regulation
on the property owner against the governmental interest being
promoted.
Based on the constitutional guidelines established by the Supreme Court, it would appear that in St. Bartholomew's, the Second Circuit correctly determined that the New York landmark
tions to permit landmark preservation so long as designation does not seriously interfere
with charitable purpose); Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121,
131, 316 N.E.2d 305, 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d. 7, 16 (1974) (applying charitable purpose standard
to owners of brownstone housing charitable organization).
14 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
145 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 837 (1987) (close nexus required). A close nexus existed between the ends sought, the preservation of historical and
architectural culture and the means chosen, the landmark preservation statute. Id.
"I See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354-55.
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preservation statute did not result in an unconstitutional taking or
infringement upon the right of St. Bartholomew's Church to the
free exercise of religion.
John A. Sheehy

